

Message Text

PAGE 01 NATO 01903 01 OF 05 021010Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2612

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 USNATO 1903

EXDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO SECDEF.

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS R), PFOR, NATO

SUBJ: SECRETARY'S BRIEFING OF NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, MARCH 26

REF: SECTO 3069

PER REFTEL THERE FOLLOWS THE APPROVED TEXT OF THE
SECRETARY'S STATEMENT TO THE NAC ON MARCH 26. WE WILL
DISTRIBUTE TEXT TO OTHER ALLIED MISSIONS AS COSMIC TOP
SECRET ON APRIL 4. BEGIN TEXT:

STATEMENT OF SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS VANCE TO THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL, MARCH 26, 1977

I AM VERY HAPPY TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH YOU
BEFORE UNDERTAKING MY TRIP TO MOSCOW. I WANT TO REAFFIRM AT
THE OUTSET THE MESSAGE CONVEYED TO YOU BY VICE PRESIDENT
MONDALE THAT OUR ADMINISTRATION WILL WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU.
IN MAY, THE PRESIDENT HIMSELF WILL BE COMING TO EUROPE TO
PARTICIPATE IN THE LONDON MINISTERIAL MEETING.

THE PRESIDENT IS DEDICATED TO THE STRENGTHENING OF THE
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PAGE 02 NATO 01903 01 OF 05 021010Z

ALLIANCE AS THE CORNERSTONE OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY AND COLLECTIVE
DEFENSE. IT IS A FIRM BASE FROM WHICH TO PURSUE OUR COMMON GOAL
OF PEACE AND SECURITY.

THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, AS YOUR KNOW, IS DEEPLY COMMITTED
TO FURTHERING THE DEMOCRATIC IDEALS WHICH HAVE ALWAYS INSPIRED
THIS ALLIANCE.

THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADMINISTRATION CAME TO OFFICE

RECOGNIZING THAT WESTERN UNITY IS A PREREQUISITE FOR THE PURSUIT OF AN EASING OF TENSIONS--BOTH IN GLOBAL TROUBLE SPOTS AND WITH THE EAST. ACCORDINGLY, WE VIEW CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF OUR FOREIGN POLICY. IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS, VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE HAS MET WITH THE COUNCIL; ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON HAS DISCUSSED MY MIDDLE EAST TRIP WITH YOU; A REPORT ON AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S AFRICAN MISSION WAS MADE AVAILABLE; DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ARMITAGE CONSULTED ON EASTERN EUROPE; EARLIER THIS WEEK, LES GELB, THE DIRECTOR OF OUR BUREAU OF POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS CAME TO CONSULT ON SALT. AFTER THE MOSCOW TALKS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY ARTHUR HARTMAN AND LES GELB WILL BE RETURNING TO BRIEF YOU ON THEM.

OUR EXPECTATIONS FOR THE MOSCOW VISIT ARE AT REALISTIC LEVELS. WE HOPE FOR PROGRESS, BUT RECOGNIZE THAT THE ROAD MAY BE DIFFICULT. OUR PURPOSES AT THIS TIME ARE TO SEE WHETHER WE CAN AGREE UPON A FRAMEWORK FOR THE NEGOTIATION OF A SALT II AGREEMENT, TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF ADDITIONAL INITIATIVES IN THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL, AND TO DISCUSS A RANGE OF INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, INCLUDING THE MIDDLE EAST, AFRICA, AND BERLIN.

SALT WILL RECEIVE THE PRINCIPAL ATTENTION. AS I HAVE INDICATED, WE WILL ALSO WANT TO SOUND OUT SOVIET VIEWS ON A RANGE OF OTHER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES. THESE INCLUDE A COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN, NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION, MBFR, INDIAN OCEAN MILITARY LIMITATIONS, CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFER

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SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01903 01 OF 05 021010Z

RESTRAINTS, AS WELL AS LIMITATIONS ON ANTI-SATELLITE CAPABILITIES, PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF MISSILE FLIGHT TESTS, AND POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAMS.

IN THE INTERNATIONAL AREA, THE SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY WISH TO DISCUSS CYPRUS AND THE UPCOMING BELGRADE CONFERENCE AS WELL.

THERE ARE ALSO SOME US-SOVIET BILATERAL ISSUES THAT WE HOPE TO DEAL WITH, INCLUDING FAMILY REUNIFICATION CASES, MARITIME SHIPPING, CIVIL AVIATION PROBLEMS, AND THE EXTENSION OF SEVERAL OF OUR COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS.

BEFORE I TURN TO THESE MATTERS IN MORE DETAIL, I WOULD LIKE TO SAY A FEW WORDS ABOUT OUR OVERALL PERSPECTIVE ON RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION.

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PAGE 01 NATO 01903 02 OF 05 021020Z
ACTION SS-25

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2613
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 5 USNATO 1903

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FIRST, WE REGARD EAST-WEST RELATIONS AS ONE ASPECT OF AN ESSENTIALLY THREE-FOLD FOREIGN POLICY, A POLICY THAT WORKS FOR PEACE THROUGH STRENGTHENED TIES WITH OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS, THE IMPROVEMENT OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING, AND HELP IN CALMING CRISIS AREAS. OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION IS AN ESSENTIAL PART OF THIS THREE-FOLD APPROACH. THUS, WE SEEK TO RESTRAIN MILITARY COMPETITION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, ENCOURAGE RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR TOWARDS CRISIS AREAS, AND ENLIST SOVIET COOPERATION IN INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH GLOBAL ISSUES.

SECOND, WE REGARD RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION AS MULTIFACETED: BOTH COMPETITIVE AND COOPERATIVE ELEMENTS ARE PRESENT. WE HOLD NO ILLUSION THAT WE CAN ELIMINATE THE COMPETITIVE ASPECTS OF THE RELATIONSHIP OR TRANSFORM THE SOVIET SYSTEM. WE WILL TRY TO EXPAND COOPERATION WHERE POSSIBLE, BUT WE WILL NOT SHRINK FROM DIFFERING WITH THE SOVIET UNION WHEN WE DEEM IT NECESSARY.

THIRD, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD DEAL WITH EACH FACET OF THE US-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP ON ITS OWN MERITS, ALTHOUGH SOME ISSUES INEVITABLY OVERLAP. IN THAT WAY WE CAN PROCEED WITH THE VARIOUS SUBJECTS ON OUR AGENDAS--ARMS CONTROL, RESTRAINT IN THIRD AREAS, TRANDE, HUMAN RIGHTS--ON AN ISSUE-BY-ISSUE BASIS. THE FACT REMAINS, HOWEVER, THAT CONFRONTATION IN THE

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PAGE 02 NATO 01903 02 OF 05 021020Z

THIRD WORLD OR OVERT REPRESSION IN THE SOVIET UNION CANNOT HELP BUT INFLUENCE THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN WHICH WE PURSUE DETENTE.

I KNOW THAT ALL OF YOUR HAVE PARTICULAR INTEREST IN OUR APPROACH TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTION. THE PRESIDENT IS DEEPLY COMMITTED TO AFFIRMING THE BASIC RIGHTS AND DIGNITY OF INDIVIDUALS. HE BELIEVES THAT WE HAVE A COMMITMENT TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TO GIVE EXPRESSION TO OUR BASIC VALUES IN OUR CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY. WE MUST STATE WHAT WE STAND FOR

AND WHAT WE BELIEVE. THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT HESITATE TO STATE ITS VIEWS. OUR VALUES MUST SHAPE OUR GOALS, OR WE WILL BE RUDDERLESS IN OUR LONG-TERM APPROACH. SUCH AN APPROACH WILL BUILD DOMESTIC SUPPORT FOR OUR FOREIGN POLICIES.

THE US INTENT IS TO WEAVE OUR CONCERN ABOUT HUMAN RIGHTS INTO OUR ENTIRE FOREIGN POLICY. IT IS AN AMERICAN INTEREST, MUCH AS WE HAVE ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND SECURITY INTERESTS. WE RECOGNIZE, OF COURSE, THAT THIS EFFORT REQUIRES CAREFULLY CONSIDERED APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS PRINCIPLES IN OUR REACTION TO PRACTICAL SITUATIONS IN DIFFERENT COUNTRIES. OUR AIM IS TO IMPROVE -- NOT TO WORSEN -- THE PLIGHT OF THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED. WE ARE FIRMLY COMMITTED TO PURSUING THIS ISSUE, BUT WILL DO SO WITH CAREFUL REGARD TO THE FULL RANGE OF OUR INTERESTS IN EACH SPECIFIC COUNTRY AND REGION AFFECTED.

THE PRESEDNET HAS STATED CLEARLY, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO SINGLE OUT THE SOVIET UNION. OUR HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS MUST BE VIEWED TOGETHER WITH OTHER IMPORTANT US AND ALLIED INTERESTS THAT WE PURSUE WITH MOSCOW. MOST IMPORTANT IS THE AREA OF ARMS CONTROL. IN SHORT, IT SHOULD PROVE POSSIBLE TO CONTINUE NEGOTIATIONS OVER ARMS CONTROL ISSUES DESPITE OUR DISAGREEMENTS ON OTHER ISSUES. WE HAVE NO WISH TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH IT BECOMES IMPOSSIBLE TO TREAT WITH A GOVERNMENT WHOSE ACTIONS ARE BEING CRITICIZED.

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SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01903 02 OF 05 021020Z

TURNING TO SALT, I KNOW THAT LES GELB, EARLIER THIS WEEK, PROVIDED YOU WITH A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF OUR SALT REVIEW AND OUR THINKING ON THE VARIOUS ISSUES INVOLVED.

I AM TAKING TWO PACKAGES TO MOSCOW. ONE IS A COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE. THE OTHER IS BASED ON THE AGGREGATE VLADIVOSTOK LEVELS OF 2,400 STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES AND A 1,320 CEILING ON MISSILES EQUIPPED WITH MIRVS BUT DEFERS THE BACKFIRE AND CRUISE MISSILE ISSUES UNTIL SALT III.

LET ME DESCRIBE THE COMPREHENSIVE PACKAGE IN SOME GREATER DETAIL. ITS ESSENTIAL PURPOSE IS TO ACHIEVE GREATER STRATEGIC STABILITY THROUGH A REDUCTION IN THE VULNERABILITY OF FIXED ICBMS. MORE GENERALLY, IT WOULD REPRESENT A GENUINE ARMS CONTROL ACHIEVEMENT IN TERMS OF REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND REAL CONSTRAINTS ON QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS IN DEPLOYED FORCES. THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THIS APPROACH ARE:

--IT WOULD INVOLVE A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC DELIVERY VEHICLES FROM 2,400 DOWN TO ABOUT

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PAGE 01 NATO 01903 03 OF 05 021027Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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S E C R E T SECTION 3 OF 5 USNATO 1903

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2,000. REDUCTIONS TO THESE LEVELS WOULD IN NO WAY
DISADVANTAGE THE UNITED STATES AND THE WEST IN THE
STRATEGIC MEASURE OF NUCLEAR PARITY OR IN ANY LESS-THAN-
ALL-OUT NUCLEAR EXCHANGE. IT WOULD ENHANCE STRATEGIC
STABILITY:

-- A REDUCTION IN THE MIRV CEILINGS FOR BOTH SIDES FROM
1,320 TO ABOUT 1,200. THIS REDUCTION WOULD LEAVE US
AN ABUNDANCE OF WARHEADS FOR ALL TARGETING AND BARGAINING
REQUIREMENTS;

-- PREFERENTIAL REDUCTIONS IN HEAVY SOVIET ICBMS. THIS
WOULD BE THE FIRST STEP TOWARD REDUCING THE DISPARITY
IN THE ICBM THROW WEIGHT BETWEEN THE SOVIET UNION AND
THE UNITED STATES;

-- A FREEZE ON THE DEPLOYMENT OF EXISTING ICBMS. THIS
WOULD PLACE CEILINGS ON THE NUMBER OF ICBMS EQUIPPED
WITH MIRVS;

-- A BAN ON MODIFICATIONS TO EXISTING ICBMS. THIS
WOULD REINFORCE THE PREVIOUS POINT BY PREVENTING QUALITATIVE
IMPROVEMENTS ON ICBMS ALREADY DEPLOYED;

-- A BAN ON THE TESTING, DEVELOPMENT AND DEPLOYMENT OF
NEW ICBMS. THIS WOULD UNDERPIN OUR WHOLE EFFORT TO PREVENT
QUALITATIVE UPGRADING OF ICBMS ON EITHER SIDE.

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SECRET

PAGE 02 NATO 01903 03 OF 05 021027Z

-- CRUISE MISSILES WILL BE BANNED OVER A CERTAIN RANGE.
THE CEILING ON RANGE WOULD, OF COURSE, BE CONSISTENT
WITH US AND ALLIED INTERESTS IN THIS NEW WEAPON
SYSTEM AND WITH OUR GOALS FOR SALT III;

-- FINALLY, IT WOULD INCLUDE CONSTRAINTS ON THE SOVIET
BACKFIRE BOMBER TO ENSURE THAT IT WOULD NOT BE USED

IN A STRATEGIC ROLE.

THIS IS, AS I HAVE SAID, A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO SALT. THE PRESIDENT AND I WANT TO HAVE A FULL RUN AT TRYING TO CONVINCE THE SOVIET UNION THAT THIS APPROACH MAKES MUTUAL SENSE AND THAT IT, INDEED, WOULD ENHANCE WORLD SECURITY.

OUR ALTERNATIVE TO A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH IF THE SOVIETS SHOULD REJECT IT IS TO SET ASIDE THE CRUISE MISSILES AND BACK-FIRE ISSUES. IN DOING SO, WE WOULD THEN WANT TO MOVE EXPEDITIOUSLY INTO SALT III IN ORDER TO RESOLVE THESE AND ALL OTHER REMAINING ISSUES AND SIGN A NEW TREATY.

WHAT WE PLAN TO DO IN MOSCOW IS TO PRESENT THESE TWO ALTERNATIVES TO THE SOVIET UNION. IF ONE APPROACH APPEARS PROMISING, WE WILL SEEK TO USE IT AS A FRAMEWORK FOR REOPENING SALT DISCUSSIONS AT GENEVA. EVEN IF THE US AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE ABLE TO AGREE UPON A SINGLE OVERALL APPROACH IN MOSCOW, NUMEROUS REMAINING QUESTIONS WILL NEED TO BE DECIDED AFTER THE MOSCOW TALKS.

A RETURN TO GENEVA AND CAREFUL ADDITIONAL WORK AT THE DELEGATION LEVEL CLEARLY WILL BE REQUIRED, HOWEVER, BEFORE THE ELEMENTS OF AN AGREEMENT FALL INTO PLACE. IN THE PROCESS OF REFINING OUR POSITIONS ON THESE AND OTHER SALT QUESTIONS, WE WILL CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES WITH YOU.

NOW LET ME TURN TO THE QUESTION OF SEEKING AN END TO NUCLEAR TESTING. AS YOU KNOW, PRESIDENT CARTER HAS PUBLICLY STATED THAT HE WISHES TO MOVE QUICKLY TOWARD A COMPREHENSIVE

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SECRET

PAGE 03 NATO 01903 03 OF 05 021027Z

TEST BAN TREATY.

THE POSSIBILITY OF FURTHER PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REPRESENTS A THREAT TO THE SECURITY OF ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE, AND THE QUEST FOR A CESSATION OF TESTING WILL BE A KEY ELEMENT OF OUR NON-PROLIFERATION STRATEGY.

WHILE OUR ULTIMATE GOAL IS THE ADHERENCE OF ALL NUCLEAR POWERS TO SUCH A TREATY, THE PRESIDENT HAS CALLED UPON THE USSR TO JOIN THE UNITED STATES IN A CESSATION OF TESTING FOR A PERIOD OF LIMITED DURATION AS A FIRST STEP TOWARD THAT GOAL. I INTEND TO EXPLORE THIS WITH THE SOVIETS IN MOSCOW. IN THIS CONNECTION I WOULD POINT OUT THAT WE ARE OPPOSED TO ANY PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSION EXCEPTION. I ALSO WANT TO UNDERSCORE THE IMPORTANCE OF ADEQUATE VERIFICATION.

WE ARE UNDERTAKING AN INTENSIVE STUDY OF WHAT VERIFICATION PROVISIONS WILL BE REQUIRED IN THIS REGARD.

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PAGE 01 NATO 01903 04 OF 05 021036Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2615
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S E C R E T SECTION 4 OF 5 USNATO 1903

EXDIS

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A CTB WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT NATO STRATEGY FOR DETER-
RENCE AND DEFENSE AND WILL CONSTRAIN SOVIET FORCE MODERNIZA-
TION PROGRAMS. OUR NUCLEAR CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT OUR COMMIT-
MENTS WILL NOT BE IMPAIRED UNDER A CTB.

WE WILL BE CONSULTING CLOSELY WITH MEMBERS OF THE
ALLIANCE ON THE SUBSTANCE AND PROSPECTS FOR AN AGREEMENT. AT
ONE POINT, IT MAY BE USEFUL TO MOVE NEGOTIATIONS TO A MULTI-
LATERAL FORUM SUCH AS THE CCD, ONCE OUR INITIAL DISCUSSIONS
ARE SUFFICIENTLY ADVANCED IN ORDER TO GAIN THE WIDEST POSSIBLE
SUPPORT FOR A CTB.

TURNING NOW TO MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION TALKS, WE
REGARD PROGRESS IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS AS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT
IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE ADMINISTRATION HAS RECENTLY UNDER-
TAKEN A REVIEW OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND HAS CONCLUDED THAT AN
EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO GIVE GREATER POLITICAL IMPETUS TO THE
TALKS. WE BELIEVE THAT THE FUNDAMENTAL ALLIANCE OBJECTIVES,
INCLUDING APPROXIMATE PARITY OF OUTCOME, COLLECTIVITY OF
OBLIGATIONS, AND AN EMPHASIS ON SOVIET GROUND FORCE REDUCTIONS,
REMAIN VALID, AND SHOULD BE PURSUED VIGOROUSLY.

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PAGE 02 NATO 01903 04 OF 05 021036Z

IN MOSCOW I INTEND TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO
MBFR AND TO URGE THE SOVIET UNION TO COME FORWARD WITH POSITIVE
STEPS TO MATCH THOSE MADE BY NATO IN THE OPTION III NUCLEAR
OFFER. IT IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT THAT THE SOVIET UNION GIVE
SOME INDICATION OF ITS WILLINGNESS TO MOVE TOWARD THE CONCEPT

OF MANPOWER PARITY, INCLUDING AN INDICATION OF ITS WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT THE ASYMMETRICAL REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD BE REQUIRED TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL.

NO NEW MBFR PROPOSALS WILL BE MADE IN MOSCOW. I BELIEVE THAT THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED BY MY VISIT SHOULD BE USED TO PRESS THE SOVIETS TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY AND WILLINGNESS TO OPEN THE WAY FOR SERIOUS MOVEMENT IN MBFR. IN COMING MONTHS, WE WANT TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU AS TO OUR SENSE OF CURRENT SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND ON THE TACTICS THAT THE ALLIANCE SHOULD PURSUE TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES. IF WE CAN PERSUADE THE SOVIETS TO ACCEPT OUR NEGOTIATING OBJECTIVES, WE WILL WANT TO BE IN A POSITION OURSELVES TO RESPOND FLEXIBLY. IN THAT WAY, WE CAN EMPHASIZE OUR SERIOUSNESS OF INTENT TO CARRY NEGOTIATIONS THROUGH TO AN AGREEMENT.

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION WILL ALSO BE AN IMPORTANT TOPIC. WE WILL USE THE MOSCOW TALKS TO STRESS, AS WE HAVE IN OUR CONSULTATIONS WITH WESTERN SUPPLIERS, THE GREAT IMPORTANCE THAT PRESIDENT CARTER ATTACHES TO THIS SUBJECT. WE WILL PROVIDE THE SOVIETS WITH AN OVERVIEW OF OUR CURRENT NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY REVIEW, INCLUDING SUCH ISSUES AS REPROCESSING, FUEL SUPPLY ASSURANCES AND FULL FUEL CYCLE SAFEGUARDS. WE WILL EMPHASIZE TO THE SOVIETS THE IMPORTANCE OF NOT WEAKENING THE SAFEGUARD REGIME ESTABLISHED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND SUPPLIER'S GROUP GUIDELINES, AND OUR CONVICTION THAT THE MULTILATERAL FRAMEWORK IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEANS OF FORMING A NUCLEAR EXPORT POLICY. I WILL ALSO SUGGEST TO THE SOVIETS THAT WE UNDERTAKE A TECHNICAL STUDY OF THE QUESTION OF SPENT FUEL STORAGE THROUGH THE US-SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT.

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PAGE 03 NATO 01903 04 OF 05 021036Z

AS TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, THE RAPID GROWTH IN SALES OVER THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS IS A SOURCE OF REAL CONCERN TO US. WE BELIEVE AN EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO CONTROL ARMS TRANSFERS, SO AS TO ENHANCE REGIONAL STABILITY AND MODERATE DANGEROUS AND WASTEFUL COMPETITION.

AS THE LARGEST SUPPLIER OF ARMS, THE US RECOGNIZES ITS RESPONSIBILITY TO TAKE THE LEAD ON THIS ISSUE. AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS A LIMIT TO WHAT WE CAN ACCOMPLISH BY UNILATERAL STEPS. FOR THIS REASON, I INTEND TO RAISE THE MATTER WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WHICH IS THE SECOND LARGEST ARMS SUPPLIER.

SHOULD THERE BE SOME INDICATION THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS ARMS TRANSFER QUESTIONS SERIOUSLY, WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU. OBVIOUSLY, THE QUESTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS HAS IMPORTANT ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND SECURITY IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO, WHICH WE WILL WANT TO CONSIDER JOINTLY.

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PAGE 01 NATO 01903 05 OF 05 021050Z
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
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S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 5 USNATO 1903

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DURING OUR MOSCOW TRIP, I ALSO INTEND TO RAISE THE SUBJECT OF MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. PRESIDENT CARTER HAS MENTIONED OUR LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE OF SEEKING AN INDIAN OCEAN FREE OF MILITARY COMPETITION. AS A FIRST STEP TOWARD THAT GOAL, I INTEND TO QUERY THE SOVIETS ON THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD MUTUAL MILITARY LIMITATIONS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. IF THERE APPEARS TO BE A SATISFACTORY BASIS FOR DISCUSSION, WE MAY WANT TO PURSUE THE QUESTION IN A PRELIMINARY WAY WITH THE SOVIET UNION. WE WILL, OF COURSE, CONSULT WITH CONCERNED ALLIES ON THIS MATTER.

IN ADDITION TO THE SUBJECTS I HAVE SPOKEN OF, WE WILL WANT TO TAKE UP, ON AN EXPLORATORY BASIS, SEVERAL QUESTIONS -- LIMITATIONS ON ANTI-SATELLITE CAPABILITIES, PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF MISSILE FLIGHT TESTS, AND THE QUESTION OF LIMITING CIVIL DEFENSE PROGRAMS.

OUR INTEREST IN PRIOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF MISSILE FLIGHT TESTS IS A CONTINUATION OF OUR EFFORTS, UNDER THE AGREEMENT ON MEASURES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF OUTBREAK OF NUCLEAR WAR, TO MINIMIZE POSSIBLE MISUNDERSTANDINGS. WE HAVE LITTLE INFORMATION ON SOVIET RECEPTIVITY TO INITIATIVES IN THE FOREGOING

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PAGE 02 NATO 01903 05 OF 05 021050Z

AREAS.

WE WILL DISCUSS WITH THE SOVIETS MY TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST. I WILL EXPLAIN THAT THERE APPEARS TO BE A CONSENSUS

AMONG THE PARTIES THAT WE SHOULD WORK TOWARD CONVENING A GENEVA CONFERENCE IN THE SECOND HALF OF THIS YEAR. THERE ALSO APPEARS TO BE AGREEMENT THAT THE PRINCIPAL ISSUES TO BE NEGOTIATED ARE THE NATURE OF PEACE, THE PROBLEM OF BOUNDARY LINES, AND SETTLEMENT OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM. THE QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION IN THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS IS BEING ADDRESSED, PRIMARILY BY THE ARABS.

WE WILL CONVEY OUR WILLINGNESS TO CONTINUE EXCHANGING VIEWS WITH THE SOVIETS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, REITERATE OUR OWN STRONG HOPE THAT THE GENEVA TALKS BE RECONVENED, AND URGE THE SOVIETS TO TAKE A CONSTRUCTIVE VIEW OF OUR EFFORTS AND THOSE OF PARTIES IN THE AREA. WE WILL NOT SEEK TO ENGAGE MORE ACTIVE SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE PROCESS AT THIS TIME.

ON THE SUBJECT OF AFRICA, WE WILL RESTATE OUR SUPPORT FOR PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE RHODESIAN AND NAMIBIAN PROBLEMS. WE WILL EXPRESS OUR CONCERNS ABOUT THE VOLATILITY OF THE SITUATION ON THE HORN OF AFRICA, AND WE WILL URGE THE SOVIETS TO EXERCISE RESTRAINING IN THAT CONTINENT, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE FLOW OF ARMS TO AFRICAN COUNTRIES.

WITH REGARD TO BERLIN, WE INTEND TO REEMPHASIZE OUR SUPPORT OF THE QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT AND MAKE PLAIN THAT ANY ACTION ON THE PART OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC THAT IS INTENDED TO ALTER FOUR POWER RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN BERLIN IS NOT ACCEPTABLE.

AS TO CYPRUS, WE WILL REAFFIRM OUR SUPPORT FOR THE INTER-COMMUNAL TALKS.

WE ALSO ANTICIPATE THAT THE SOVIETS WILL WANT TO DISCUSS
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PAGE 03 NATO 01903 05 OF 05 021050Z

THE BELGRADE CSCE MEETING WITH US. OUR RESPONSE WILL NOT GO INTO DETAIL AND WILL BE CAREFULLY BASED ON POSITIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN AGREED AMONG THE ALLIES THUS FAR.

THESE MATTERS, PLUS BILATERAL MARITIME, CIVIL AIR, AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES, WILL CONSTITUTE THE AGENDA OF MY MOSCOW TRIP. AS YOU CAN SEE, ITS SCOPE IS WIDE RANGING. MY PRIMARY PURPOSE IS TO DEAL WITH THE MAJOR STRATEGIC ISSUES FUNDAMENTAL TO OUR OVERALL INTEREST IN PEACE AND SECURITY. TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE, I WILL ALSO EXPLORE THE OTHER QUESTIONS WHICH I HAVE SET BEFORE YOU, BUT WE MAY FIND THAT THIS WILL ONLY BE DONE IN PRELIMINARY FASHION. WE WISH TO DEMONSTRATE OUR READINESS TO OPEN UP THE DIALOGUE, TO CLARIFY POSITIONS AND PREPARE THE WAY FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS.

WE WILL SHARE THE EXPERIENCE WITH YOU. IN A FEW DAYS, ARTHUR HARTMAN AND LESLIE GELB WILL RETURN TO BRIEF YOU ON

THE TRIP'S RESULTS. END TEXT.STRAUSZ-HUPE

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Disposition Action: RELEASED
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TAGS: OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS R), PFOR, NATO
To: STATE INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS
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